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Abstract
In the United States, undocumented immigrants often shy
away from accessing public services due to fear of deportation.
Chicago and Oak Park have passed ordinances commonly known as
“sanctuary policies,” which seek to promote trust between
immigrant communities and local law enforcement in order to lower
crime rates and increase public safety. The rationale is that
undocumented immigrants will feel more confident to report crimes
and utilize public and social services without fear of repercussions.
Sanctuary policies strive to create basic protections for
undocumented immigrants at a local level by limiting cooperation
with the federal government. However, many sanctuary policies are
inadequate because they contain carve-outs that leave many
undocumented populations unprotected. This comment analyzes

396

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:395

Chicago and Oak Park’s sanctuary policies. It proposes
amendments to Chicago’s Welcoming City ordinance and utilizes
Oak Park’s Welcoming Village ordinance as a model for such
changes.

I.

INTRODUCTION

President Trump’s stance on immigration is overtly more
aggressive in tone than his predecessor, Barack Obama.1 Trump’s
negative sentiments against undocumented immigrants are
translating into tangible policies that directly threaten their future
in the United States.2 While some local governments welcome the
Trump administration’s policies, others have pushed back by
enacting legislation that attempts to protect immigrant
communities.3
There are many neighborhoods in the U.S. that are known to
have large concentrations of immigrants. 4 The families living in
these communities are sometimes composed of undocumented
immigrants.5 Immigrant communities, similar to any other
1. See Adam Goodman, The Core of Donald Trump’s Immigration Policy?
Fear., WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-byhistory/wp/2017/08/24/the-core-of-donald-trumps-immigration-policy-fear/
(explaining that Trump’s anti-immigrant scare tactics were a critical
component of his campaign and are now a governing tool in his presidency); see
also Molly Roberts, The Trump administration isn’t just changing words. It’s
changing
the
country,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
23,
2018),
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/02/23/the-trumpadministration-isnt-just-changing-words-its-changing-the-country/
(stating
that “U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services erased 300 years of American
dreaming this week when it revised its stated purpose from securing ‘America’s
promise as a nation of immigrants’ to securing ‘the homeland’ — and, of course,
‘honoring our values’” ).
2. See Haley Sweetland Edwards, ‘No One Is Safe.’ How Trump’s
Immigration Policy Is Splitting Families Apart, TIME (Mar. 8, 2018),
time.com/longform/donald-trump-immigration-policy-splitting-families/
(explaining that Trump’s January 2017 Executive Order broadened the
deportation priority policy to encompass ‘all removable aliens,’ whose “effect is
an implied war on all undocumented immigrants.”).
3. See PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KATHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 119 (Cambridge University Press 2015)
(expounding that “as restrictionist fervor had begun to wane in 2012, a
countertrend was beginning to emerge, and a growing number of states began
passing pro-integration legislation”).
4. Gustavo Lopez et al., Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RES.
CTR. (May 3, 2017), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/03/key-findingsabout-u-s-immigrants/ (indicating that the “U.S. has more immigrants than any
other country in the world). “Today, more than 40 million people living in the
U.S. were born in another country, accounting for about one-fifth of the world’s
migrants in 2015.” Id.
5. Jeffrey S. Passel et al., 20 metro areas are home to six-in-ten unauthorized
immigrants in U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 9, 2017), www.pewresearch. org/fact-
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community in this country, have basic needs like access to
education, healthcare, and public safety.
However, oftentimes undocumented immigrants shy away
from accessing these services because they are afraid of being
arbitrarily detained by law enforcement even when they have not
committed a criminal infraction.6 Immigrants may refrain from
going to school, seeking treatment at hospitals, and calling the
police or going to court when they have been victims of a crime, due
to fear of deportation.7 While these are regular everyday activities
for American citizens, they are not for undocumented immigrants.
Some state and local laws attempt to address this problem. While
anti-immigrant advocates argue that these laws are in direct
conflict with federal immigration laws, they fully comply with
federal laws.8 On the other hand, pro-immigrant activist groups
argue that some of these laws need to be amended in order to fully
accomplish their goals.9
Picture a woman who has suffered violence at the hands of her
own husband for years. She finally has the courage to leave her
husband and finds refuge at a shelter, where a victim’s advocate
tank/2017/02/09/us-metro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants/ (explaining that
“the analysis also shows that unauthorized immigrants tend to live where other
immigrants live.) “Among lawful immigrants – including naturalized citizens
and noncitizens – 65% lived in those top metros.” Id.
6. See Edwards, supra note 2 (explaining that Trump’s new 2017 policy
extending the priority for deportation to all estimated 11 million undocumented
immigrants has caused “an explosion of fear among immigrant communities,
which are reacting not so much to the spiking number of arrests but to the
apparent randomness of the roundups”).
7. See Jan Hoffman, Sick and Afraid, Some Immigrants Forgo Medical Care,
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/health/un
documented-immigrants-health-care.html (stating that “[i]n a recent national
poll of providers by Migrant Clinicians Network, which is based in Austin, Tex.,
two-thirds of respondents said they had seen a reluctance among [immigrant]
patients to seek health care.”); see also Esther Yu Hsi Lee, 3 Services That
Immigrants Are Too Afraid to Access Now That Trump Is President,
THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 18, 2017) thinkprogress.org/immigrants-afraiddeportation-services-5936361b4b90/ (explaining that there has been a decrease
in the amount of immigrants reporting rape, domestic violence, and injuries
while on the job, as well as fewer people registering for safety-net programs.).
8. See CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ ET AL., Legal Limits on Immigration
Federalism, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S.
CITIES AND STATES 31, 35 (Monica W. Varsanyi ed., Stanford University Press
2010) (explaining that “[s]tates and localities tend not to contravene express
preemption provisions because of their clarity, and field preemption has become
increasingly rare as a general matter, probably because of its malleability and
capaciousness.”).
9. Fran Spielman, Immigrant Groups Want Welcoming City Ordinance
Strengthened, CHI. SUN TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), chicago.suntimes.com/chicagopolitics/immigrant-groups-want-welcoming-city-ordinance-strengthened/
(explaining that immigrant activists are demanding amendments to Chicago’s
Welcoming City ordinance so that its protections encompass every immigrant
without exceptions).
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convinces her to go to the courthouse and seek a protective order.
Her parents brought her to the United States when she was a
teenager. She has been taught to fear authority and stay away from
the police, even though she has never committed a crime. This fear
of authority has incremented among her community since President
Trump was elected due to his anti-immigrant rhetoric.10
She has been reassured that even though she is
undocumented, it is not common for immigration law enforcement
to detain people at courthouses.11 She feels safe while she is talking
to the judge. All of a sudden the courtroom doors open and she sees
an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agent come in.
She knows the agent is here to arrest her. Her husband must have
called ICE to pay her back. After the hearing is done, the judge
grants her an order of protection, which will now be irrelevant
because as soon as she walks out of that courtroom, she will be
arrested and eventually deported.12
Some cities, counties, and states throughout the country have
manifested their concern for immigrants’ fear of accessing social
and healthcare services.13 In order to lower crime rates and
establish better lines of communication with immigrant
10. Jennifer Medina, Too Scared to Report Sexual Abuse. The Fear:
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/us/
immigrants-deportation-sexual-abuse.html (indicating that “since the
presidential election, there has been a sharp downturn in reports of sexual
assault and domestic violence among Latinos throughout the country, and many
experts attribute the decline to fears of deportation”).
11. Elliot Spagat, ICE Formalizes Plans for Courthouse Arrests, CHI. TRIB.
(Jan. 31, 2018), www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-iceplans-courthouse-arrests-20180131-story.html (asserting that “[i]mmigration
agents made courtroom arrests under the Obama administration but the pace
appears to have picked up under President Donald Trump, whose
administration has seen a roughly 40 percent surge in arrests overall and has
casted a much wider net.”); see also Mica Rosenberg, U.S. Immigration Agency
Clarifies Policy on Courthouse Arrests, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2018) (discussing that
“[i]n New York, the number of ICE arrests in courthouses jumped to 139 in 2017
from 11 in 2016, according to the Immigrant Defense Project advocacy group.”).
12. Jonathan Blitzer, The Woman Arrested by ICE in a Courthouse Speaks
Out, NEW YORKER (Feb. 23, 2017), www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/thewoman-arrested-by-ice-in-a-courthouse-speaks-out. This hypothetical is based
on an actual case where a transgender woman went to a courthouse to seek an
order of protection against an abusive ex-boyfriend and was immediately
detained by ICE at the courthouse after her hearing was over. Id.
13. Understanding Trust Acts, Community Policing, and "Sanctuary Cities,"
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Oct. 10, 2015), www.americanimmigration
council.org/research/sanctuary-cities-trust-acts-and-community-policingexplained (delineating that “[s]everal hundred state and local police
departments across the country have enacted community policing policies
because they make communities safer and they help ensure that law
enforcement officers do not run afoul of the law by detaining persons they do
not have legal authority to hold (i.e., in violation of the constitutional
requirements of the Fourth Amendment)”).
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communities, some states, cities, and counties have passed
ordinances and laws commonly known as “sanctuary policies;” these
sanctuary policies further their immigration enforcement efforts by
limiting their cooperation with the federal government.14 This is
generally meant to increase public safety by promoting trust
between immigrant communities and local law enforcement so that
undocumented immigrants feel confident enough to report crimes
and utilize public and social services.15
Part II of this comment briefly discusses federalism, the
federal government’s role in immigration law, and the functions of
its agencies charged with enforcing these laws. Next, it touches on
the role of several tools used in the enforcement of federal
immigration laws like 8 U.S.C. §1373, immigration detainers,
Secure Communities, the Priority Enforcement Program, and the
287(g) Program. It discusses the conflict between sanctuary cities
and those who oppose its policies. Next, it provides a brief summary
of what sanctuary cities are, the history of the movement, and an
overview of the sanctuary cities, counties, and states in the United
States. Part III discusses Chicago’s history as a sanctuary city, its
Welcoming City ordinance, Oak Park’s Welcoming City ordinance,
and the tension between federal law and sanctuary policies.
Finally, it discusses the carve-outs in Chicago’s Welcoming
City ordinance and why they hinder the goals of the ordinance by
eroding the trust between undocumented immigrants and local law
enforcement by leaving immigrants unprotected. Part IV proposes
an amendment to Chicago’s Welcoming City ordinance that will
eliminate these carve-outs. In addition, it proposes certain
provisions of the ordinance should be expanded to cover more
ground, which will protect immigrants who have been left out, while
strengthening certain areas of non-cooperation with federal
immigration law enforcement programs.

14. E.g. Jazmine Ulloa, California Becomes 'Sanctuary State' in Rebuke of
Trump Immigration Policy, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), www.la
times.com/politics/la-pol-ca-brown-california-sanctuary-state-bill-20171005story.html.
15. Tom K. Wong, The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the
Economy,
CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Jan.
26,
2017),
www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297366/theeffects-of-sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy/
(expounding
that
“economies are stronger in sanctuary counties—from higher median household
income, less poverty, and less reliance on public assistance to higher labor force
participation,
higher
employment-to-population
ratios,
and
lower
unemployment.”).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Government's Plenary Power in
Immigration Law and Immigration Federalism
It has been established since the nineteenth century that the
federal government has plenary power to control immigration law. 16
The United States Constitution does not expressly mention
immigration, but it grants Congress the power to regulate
naturalization.17 Since the late 1800’s the Supreme Court has
expanded the Executive and Legistlative branches’ powers to
dictate immigration law.18 These two branches are able to “exclude
and deport aliens or deny certain benefits according to political,
social, economic, or other considerations.”19 The judicial branch has
consistently given deference to the other two branches by asserting
that its judicial inquiry regarding immigration legislation has a
limited scope.20
Immigration issues have become highly politicized. Some
scholars argue there has been a shift in how immigration matters
are handled.21 Where many immigration violations used to be
addresed as civil matters, they are now being treated as criminal
offenses.22 This shift is patent in “the transfer of responsibility for
immigration control from the Department of Commerce and Labor
to the Department of Justice in 1940 and ultimately to the
Department of Homeland Security [(”DHS”)]in 2002.”23
16. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 795 (2008).
17. U.S. CONST, art. I, §8, cl. 4 (establishing that Congress has power to
“establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”).
18. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (stating that
“the power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging
to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers
delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the
judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.”).
19. Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration
Policy?, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES (Feb. 25, 2009), cis.org/Report/PlenaryPower-Should-Judges-Control-US-Immigration-Policy#2.
20. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (maintaining that “our cases ‘have
long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control’” (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953));
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976) (stating “[t]he reasons that preclude
judicial review of political questions to the text of the note also dictate a narrow
standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the
area of immigration and naturalization”).
21. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, And
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 367, 387 (2006).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 387-388.
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The DHS is the federal government’s Cabinet department in
charge of enforcing immigration laws. 24 There are three separate
agencies under the Department of Homeland Security, all three
share different functions, which are relevant for the purpose of this
comment:25 (1) the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”), which is in charge of the administrative aspects
of immigration; (2) the Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”), which
is in charge of protecting the U.S. borders by identifying and barring
“illegal aliens” from entering the United States;26 and (3) the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which is in charge
of “enforc[ing] the nation’s immigration laws ... [by] identif[ying]
and apprehend[ing] removable aliens, detain[ing] those individuals
when necessary[,] and remov[ing] illegal aliens from the United
States.”27
1. Immigration enforcement tools and programs create
tension between federal and local governments
Immigration is mainly regulated under the rules established
by the Immigration and Nationality Act, which was enacted by
Congress in 1952 and has been amended multiple times. 28 However,
there are other relevant pieces of legislation that have been enacted
in the last few decades. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”)29
and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”).30 Both of these Acts contain
provisions that prohibit state and local law enforcement from
barring communications with federal law enforcement about the
unlawful status of a person.31

24. Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security; Delegations of
Authority; Immigration Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 10922 (Mar. 6, 2013) (explaining the
history of the Department of Homeland Security and that it absorbed the
functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”)).
25. The functions of these agencies are relevant for the purpose of this
comment as their purpose and function interplay with sanctuary policies.
26. See Border Patrol Overview, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (Jan. 27,
2015), www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview.
27. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Strategic Plan: 2016-2020,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (last visited Oct. 8, 2017),
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/strategic-plan2020.PDF.
28. Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (Sept. 10, 2013), www.uscis.gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act.
29. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009- 707 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373 (2012)).
30. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, P.L. 104-193.
31. Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed
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a. Section 1373: an attempt to facilitate state and local
immigration policing
8 U.S.C. §1373(a) provides that:
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or
official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any
government entity or official from sending to, or receiving
from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual.32
Furthermore, Section 434 of PRWORA, which is now codified
as 8 U.S.C. §1644, contains almost the exact same text as Section
1373(a), prohibiting state and local authorities from passing laws
that restrict communication with federal law enforcement agencies
(“LEA”).33
These laws were enacted in reponse to a pattern of behavior
from states, counties, and cities that decided to limit or avoid
cooperation with the federal government through “sanctuary
policies” in the 1980s and early 1990s when the federal government
implemented several policies to involve state and local law
enforcement in its immigration policing efforts. 34 Some believe that
sanctuary cities and states are infringing upon these laws,35 but
Approach To Immigration Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform,
20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 168-69 (2016) (explaining that these laws “were
passed within weeks of each other in an attempt to encourage and explicitly
authorize state and local law enforcement agencies to communicate with federal
immigration authorities regarding the status and presence of unauthorized
immigrants in their jurisdictions”).
32. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1373(a)(2012)).
33. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 434, 110 Stat. 2105, 2275 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1644 (2012)) (indicating that “notwithstanding any other provision of Federal,
State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in
any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of an alien in the United States.”); see also Orde F. Kittrie, Article:
Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 1449, 1495 (2006) (explaining that Section 1373 “prohibits both (1) a
government entity or official (e.g., the mayor) from restricting disclosure by
another government entity (e.g., the police department), and (2) a government
entity or official (e.g., the police department) from restricting disclosure by a
government official (e.g., an individual police officer). Section 1644 prohibits the
first but not the second type of restriction”).
34. McCormick, supra note 31, at 168-69.
35. Alexandra Desanctis, Can Congress Force an End to ‘Sanctuary City’
Policies?,
NAT’L
REVIEW
(Nov.
30,
2016)
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immigrant rights proponents argue that sanctuary policies do not
violate federal laws.36 While these two provisions prohibit laws that
restrict communications, they do not require state and local
governments and officials to cooperate either by collecting and
sharing information (including legal status and criminal
information) or complying with ICE detainers.37 So, because of the
narrow scope of sanctuary policies, most, if not all do not infringe
upon these laws.
b. Detainers: a problematic and powerful tool in
immigration enforcement
Over the years, the federal government has put several
programs in place to involve state and local authorities in the
enforcement of immigration laws. One of the most powerful tools
immigration law enforcement uses in conjunction with its programs
is the “detainer,” also commonly known as an “immigration hold.” 38
A detainer is a notice that may be issued by an immigration officer
requesting state or local law enforcement to hold a detained person
for 48 hours so that federal immigration officers can arrest and
deport said person.39 This means that whenever an undocumented
person is arrested, immigration officers can ask state and local
authorities to detain that person for a longer period of time when
otherwise that person would be free to go.
Courts have limited the nature of detainers. In Galarza v.
www.nationalreview.com/article/442578/sanctuary-cities-federal-lawcongresss-power-purse-incentivizes-cooperation-john.
36. See Fact Sheet on Sanctuary Policies and 8 USC 1373, Immigrant Legal
Resource
Center
(Feb.
13,
2017)
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/8_usc_1373_and_federal_fund
ing_threats_to_sanctuary_cities.pdf.
37. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that
“no provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
et seq., authorize federal officials to command local or state officials to detain
suspected aliens subject to removal”).
38.
Immigration
Detainers,
AM.
C.L.
UNION,
www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrolabuses/immigration-detainers (last visited Apr. 20, 2019) (explaining that “[a]n
ICE detainer—or “immigration hold”—is one of the key tools U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) uses to apprehend individuals who come in
contact with local and state law enforcement agencies and put them into the
federal deportation system”).
39. See 8 C.F.R. §287.7(a) (stating that “a detainer serves to advise another
law enforcement agency that the Department seeks custody of an alien
presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and
removing the alien”); see also 8 C.F.R. §287.7(d) (explicating that “upon a
determination by the Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise
detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department”).
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Szalczyk, a U.S. citizen was held due to an ICE detainer even after
posting bail following an arrest on a drug-related offense.40 It took
immigration officers three days after he posted bail to realize that
he was a U.S. citizen and lift the detainer. 41 The Third Circuit held
that compliance with ICE detainers is voluntary because they are
requests, not commands.42 It also established that “a conclusion
that a detainer issued by a federal agency is an order that state and
local agencies are compelled to follow, is inconsistent with the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.”43
In Morales v. Chadbourne, the First Circuit determined that in
order to issue an immigration detainer, immigration officers must
have probable cause so as not to infringe on a person’s Fourth
Amendment rights.44 It also held that detaining someone beyond
their release date, for another purpose, constitutes a new seizure
for Fourth Amendment purposes.45 Following the same line, in
Morales v. Napolitano, the Illinois Northern District Court ruled
that most detainers issued by ICE without a warrant are invalid
because they go beyond their statutory authority due to their failure
to determine whether that person would be likely to escape, as
directed in 8 U.S.C. §1357(2).46 Furthermore, in Buquer v. City of
Indianapolis, the district court ruled that it is unconstitutional for
immigration officers to arrest a person without a warrant and for
matters that are not criminal.47

40. Galarza, 745 F.3d at 640-41.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 643 (expounding that “under the Tenth Amendment, immigration
officials may not order state and local officials to imprison suspected aliens
subject to removal at the request of the federal government”).
44. Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 216-17, (1st Cir. 2015) (expressing
that “based on the ‘robust consensus of cases [and] persuasive authority’ … it is
beyond debate that an immigration officer in 2009 would need probable cause
to arrest and detain individuals for the purpose of investigating their
immigration status.”).
45. Id. at 217 (explaining that “because Morales was kept in custody for a
new purpose after she was entitled to release, she was subjected to a new
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes —- one that must be supported by a
new probable cause justification”).
46. Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1008-09 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
(maintaining that “the bottom line is that, because immigration officers make
no determination whatsoever that the subject of a detainer is likely to escape
upon release before a warrant can be obtained, ICE's issuance of detainers that
seek to detain individuals without a warrant goes beyond its statutory authority
to make warrantless arrests under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)”).
47. Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45084, at *35,
(manifesting that “even if Section 20 were not preempted by federal law,
because it authorizes state and local law enforcement officers to effect
warrantless arrests for matters that are not crimes, it runs afoul of the Fourth
Amendment, and thus, is unconstitutional on those grounds”).
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Back to square one: Secure Communities and the
Priority Enforcement Program

ICE kicked off the Secure Communities (“S-Comm”) program
in 2008 in an effort to involve state and local law enforcement in
immigration policing by giving them power to enforce federal
immigration laws.48 Through S-Comm, every time a person is
booked into a jail, the LEA will take that person’s fingerprints and
booking information and will submit it to an electronic database
where the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) and the
Department of Homeland Security share information. 49 If the
database shows that the arrestee has an immigration record, ICE
is notified.50 Then the law enforcement agency will determine the
person’s status and based on whether or not she is deportable, it
will issue a detainer.51 Unlike other programs, S-Comm is based on
a computerized database and “no local law-enforcement agents are
deputized to enforce immigration laws.” 52 By January 22, 2013, SComm had been fully implemented within the “50 states, the
District of Columbia, and five U.S. Territories.”53
The S-Comm widely utilized detainers as a tool, which caused
a spike in deportations.54 While some considered the program a
success due to its deportation numbers, many began to oppose it,
claiming that it “encourage[d] racial profiling, diverted local
resources from crime control, and made communities less safe by

48. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 3, at 129 (asserting
that S-Comm “was an information-leveraging program that forwarded
information about every arrestee in a local jurisdiction to a federal database
that checks for lawful status”).
49. Secure Communities: Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (May 19, 2017), www.ice.gov/secure-communities.
50. Miriam Valverde, Trump says Secure Communities, 287(g) Immigration
Programs Worked, POLITIFACT (Sept. 6, 2016), www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2016/sep/06/donald-trump/trump-says-secure-communities287g-immigration-pro/.
51. Secure Communities: A Fact Sheet, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Nov. 29,
2011),
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/secure-communitiesfact-sheet.
52. Id.
53. Secure Communities: Overview, supra note 49.
54. Christopher N. Lasch, Supreme Court - October Term 2011: Federal
Immigration Detainers After Arizona V. United States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629,
677 (2013); see also Aarti Kohli et al., Secure Communities by the Numbers: An
Analysis of Demographics and Due Process, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY L. SCH.
(Oct.
2011)
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_
Numbers.pdf (explaining that “the numbers are sobering: annual deportations
have increased over 400% since 1996 and more than a million people have been
removed from this country since the beginning of the Obama administration.”
(citing Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Aug. 2011) 15, 94
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/ ois_yb_2010.pdf)).
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discouraging immigrants from reporting crimes or cooperating with
police.”55 Although DHS claimed it meant to prioritize the
deportation of undocumented immigrants with serious criminal
offenses, who were a threat to public safety,56 a high number of
detainees did not have serious criminal convictions.57
For these reasons, some state and local authorities began to
refuse to participate in the program and comply with detainers, and
started enacting sanctuary policies to counteract the negative
effects of S-Comm.58 The initial response of DHS was to emphasize
that participation in the program was mandatory, 59 but states and
local governments were still getting conflicting and misleading
information on the matter.60 Opponents and a series of lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of S-Comm and detainers led DHS
to give in. In 2014, because the “program had attracted a great deal
of criticism, was widely misunderstood, and was embroiled in
litigation,” DHS decided to discontinue the S-Comm program.61
55. Lasch, supra note 54; see also Violeta R. Chapin, ¡Silencio!
Undocumented Immigrant Witnesses and the Right to Silence, 17 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 119, 151 (2011) (discussing a study by the Consortium for Police
Leadership in Equity (“CPLE”) that revealed that “police departments continue
to have valid concerns about their role in policing immigration”).
56. Secure Communities: FAQs, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(May 19, 2017) www.ice.gov/secure-communities.
57. Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation
and Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 28
(2016).
58. See Juliet P. Stumpf, D(E)Volving Discretion: Lessons from The Life and
Times of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2015) (indicating
that “cities and states resisted federal enlistment of their law enforcement
resources to aid the program and issued policies and legislation to limit its local
effect”).
59. Karen J. Pita Loor, A Study on Immigrant Activism, Secure
Communities, And Rawlsian Civil Disobedience, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 565, 568
(2016) (citing Homeland Sec. Advisory Council, Task Force on Secure Comtys.
Findings and Recommendations (2011), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsactask-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf).
60. See Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. United States Immigration &
Customs Enf't Agency, 811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (signaling that
“[t]here is ample evidence that ICE and DHS have gone out of their way to
mislead the public about Secure Communities”); see also Chen, supra note 57,
at n. 36 (discussing the confusion regarding the conflicting statements issued
by ICE in this period); Maddie Oatman, Secure Governor, Insecure
Communities, MOTHER JONES (Nov, 4, 2010), www.motherjones.com/
politics/2010/11/jerry-brown-secure-communities-program/ (discussing the
mixed signals from ICE when the state of California asked for clarification on
whether local governments could opt out of S-Comm).
61. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski et al. (Nov. 20, 2014) www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf.
“Governors,
mayors, and state and local law enforcement officials around the country have
increasingly refused to cooperate with the program, and many have issued
executive orders or signed laws prohibiting such cooperation.” Id.
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As S-Comm was rolled back, the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security announced that it would be immediately
replaced with the Priority Enforcement Program (“PEP”).62 PEP, as
its predecessor, required the cooperation of state and local law
enforcement to submit people’s fingerprints and criminal history
into a database shared by the FBI and DHS. 63 Some of the
differences between PEP and S-Comm that stand out is that, in lieu
of issuing a detainer, immigration officers could request notification
from LEAs whenever a person of interest was going to be released.64
This meant that detainers were to be issued only when a
person was an “enforcement priority and that there [was] probable
cause to believe that the subject is removable (such as a final order
of removal).”65 PEP shared more similarities than differences with
its predecessor.66 It still contained problematic practices that raised
concerns of liability for ICE and LEAs due to possible Fourth
Amendment violations in the issuance and compliance of
detainers.67 Particularly, “ICE’s new detainer form … d[id] not
require a judicial warrant, judicial determination of probable cause,
or even an individual, particularized statement of probable cause.” 68
As part of his immigration platform, Trump criticized the
Obama administration for eliminating S-Comm and vowed to bring
it back.69 On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued an
executive order where, among other things, he ordered the
termination of PEP and the reinstitution of the S-Comm Program.70
Since its implementation in 2008 until the second quarter of 2017’s
62. Id.
63. Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, (June 22, 2017) www.ice.gov/pep.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See generally Barbara E. Armacost, "Sanctuary" Laws: The New
Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1209-11 (2016).
67. Letter from Advancing Justice–AAJC, Advancing Justice-Asian Law
Caucus, American Civil Liberties Union, Immigrants’ Rights Project,
Immigrant Defense Project, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, National
Immigrant Justice Center, National Immigration Law Center, National
Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, National Day Laborer
Organizing Network, New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Washington Defender Association’s Immigration
Project, to Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (June 17, 2015)
www.aclu.org/letter/letter-dhs-regarding-implementation-ices-new-priorityenforcement-program-pep (arguing that the detainer notification forms and
detainers themselves may “expose DHS and local law enforcement agencies to
liability for extended detentions and transfers of custody that do not meet the
Fourth Amendment’s requirements”).
68. Id.
69. Domenico Montanaro, et al., Fact Check: Donald Trump's Speech on
Immigration, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 31, 2016), www.npr.org/2016/08/31/
492096565/fact-check-donald-trumps-speech-on-immigration.
70. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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fiscal year, the program affected 315,200 people.71 The social and
legal concerns from the state and local governments who questioned
S-Comm remain unresolved.
d. The 287(g) Program: Deputizing state and local law
enforcement
Another federal immigration program that promotes the
cooperation of state and local law enforcement in its immigration
policing is the 287(g) program, which is named after the
Immigration and Nationality Act’s Section 287(g), and is also
known as Section 1357(g) of Title 8 of the United States Code.72 This
program grants the Attorney General the power to deputize state
and local officers to perform the functions of immigration officers.73
It allows state and local law enforcement to partner up with federal
immigration authorities through a Memorandum of Agreement
(“MOA”).74
While PEP and S-Comm have hands-off approaches where
state and local law enforcement do not perform the functions of
immigration officers, with the 287(g) program, deputized officers
have the authorization to: (1) interview people regarding their
immigration status, access people’s information on DHS databases;
(2) issue detainers, submit information into ICE’s database, issue
Notices to Appear; (3) recommend that a person gets voluntary
departure instead of undergoing regular removal proceedings; (4)
recommend a person be detained and decide whether they should
have access to an immigration bond; and (5) transfer people into
ICE custody.75
The first MOA was signed in 2002 with Florida.76 There are
three models of the 287(g) program: (1) the Jail Enforcement Model;
(2) the Task Force Model; and (3) the Hybrid Model.77 In the Jail
Enforcement Model, officers can inquire about a person’s legal
status, maintain communications with ICE regarding the
noncitizen in their custody, transfer noncitizens to ICE custody, and

71. Secure Communities: FAQs, supra note 56
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000).
73. Id.; see also The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL
(May 15, 2017), www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/287g-programimmigration.
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000).
75. Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 3, 2017),
www.ice.gov/287g.
76. Randy Capps et al., Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State
and Local Immigration Enforcement, MIGRATION POL’Y INSTITUTE 9
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf.
77. Id.
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issue detainers.78 In the Task Force Model, officers can inquire
about a person’s legal status, issue detainers in the field (as opposed
to 287(g) jail officers who can only do so in detention facilities), and
issue and enforce warrants for immigration-related violations.79
Finally, in the Hybrid Model, both the Jail and Task Force Models
operate side by side.80
Detractors of the 287(g) program have raised many concerns
regarding its implementation. Some argue that the program allows
for racial profiling, is too expensive, that ICE does not give enough
guidance and supervision to the deputized officers and that it harms
the relationship between immigrant communities and local police,
which obstructs their law enforcement efforts. 81 It has been found
that the program is not targeting serious criminal offenders,
resulting in the detention of noncitizens with misdemeanors or
traffic violations.82 Due to its constant criticism, the DHS launched
several investigations, which led ICE to shut down the Task Force
Model.83 ICE currently has agreements with seventy-eight law
enforcement agencies within twenty states, utilizing the Jail
Enforcement Model.84
2. Sanctuary cities: What are they and why are they
protecting immigrants?
a. Are undocumented immigrants criminals?
The idea that undocumented immigrants are criminals is a
common misconception among the American population. This is a
relevant factor affecting the current, highly politicized, debate
regarding immigrants. Not all undocumented immigrants are
committing a crime simply because they stepped foot on U.S. soil.85
There is a distinction between illegal entry and unlawful presence,

78. Id. at 14.
79. Id. at 15; see also Mimi E. Tsankov & Christina J. Martin, Immigration
Law Symposium: Measured Enforcement: A Policy Shift in the ICE 287(g)
Program, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 403, 417 (explaining that the Task Force
Model “allows law enforcement officers participating in criminal task forces,
such as drug or gang task forces, to screen arrested individuals using federal
databases to assess their immigration status”).
80. Capps et al., supra note 76.
81. The 287(g) Program: An Overview, supra note 73.
82. Capps et al., supra note 76, at 2.
83. Armacost, supra note 66, at 1208.
84. Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 3, 2017),
www.ice.gov/287g.
85. Issue Brief: Criminalizing Undocumented Criminals, American Civil
Liberty Union 1 (Feb. 2010) www.aclu.org/files/assets/FINAL_criminalizing_
undocumented_immigrants_issue_brief_PUBLIC_VERSION.pdf.
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which most Americans are unaware of.86 Illegal entry is when a
person enters the United States without being inspected by an
immigration official, by eluding them or by willful, false
representation.87 Illegal entry is a criminal offense that can amount
to a misdemeanor or a felony.88
Conversely, unlawful presence is when a person enters the
United States with proper authorization and they either overstay
their visa, work without authorization, or violate the conditions
stipulated on their visa.89 Unlawful presence is only a civil
violation.90 As of 2006, 45% of undocumented immigrants in the
United States had not entered illegaly, but entered with a visa and
overstayed.91 While criminal law is meant to punish, civil law is
meant to compensate.92 The distinction between civil and criminal
offenses in the context of immigration is important due to the social
stigma the latter can carry.93
The United States is currently divided in its stance on
immigration. Its opponents argue that immigrants not only take
away lower and middle class jobs that should be given to American
citizens, but are also a burden on our economy.94 They further argue
that immigrants increase crime and contribute to the decline in
public safety.95 On the other hand, immigration proponents argue
86. de Jesus Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2012)
(emphasizing that “[a]lthough we have recognized that illegal presence may be
some indication of illegal entry, unlawful presence need not result from illegal
entry”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Issue Brief: Criminalizing Undocumented Criminals, supra note 85; see
also 8 U.S.C.S. § 1325 (2019).
88. Issue Brief: Criminalizing Undocumented Criminals, supra note 85.
89. Id.
90. de Jesus Ortega Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1000 (underscoring that “unlike
illegal entry, mere unauthorized presence in the United States is not a crime”).
91. Issue Brief: Criminalizing Undocumented Criminals, supra note 85
(citing Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 22, 2006), www.pewhispanic.org/2006/05/22/modes-of-entry-for-theunauthorized-migrant-population/).
92. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law., 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1796 (1992).
93. NATALIE MASUOKA & JANE JUNN, THE POLITICS OF BELONGING: RACE,
PUBLIC OPINION, AND IMMIGRATION 168 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2013) (“the
link between illegal immigration and criminality has effectively framed illegal
immigration as a violation of cherished American norms of respect for
institutions and violation of cherished American norms of respect for
institutions and fairness”).
94. Spencer P. Morrison, A $116 Billion Burden: The Economics of Illegal
Immigration, AM. GREATNESS (Sept. 29, 2017), amgreatness.com/2017/09/29/a116-billion-burden-the-economics-of-illegal-immigration/ (arguing that “illegal
immigration has real economic consequences—whatever the Left may tell
you.”).
95. Loren Collingwood & Benjamin Gonzalez-O'Brien, Jeff Sessions Used
Our Research to Claim That Sanctuary Cities Have More Crime. He’s Wrong.,
WASHINGTON POST (July 14, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
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the direct opposite. Besides claiming that cultural diversity
enriches the country, they argue that immigrant workers reinforce
productivity growth and strengthen labor markets. 96
Immigrants' contribution to the labor market actually reduces
the costs of goods and services, which leaves the average consumer
with money in their pocket.97 The increase in immigrant population
has caused home services to become more affordable, forging the
path for American women to join the workforce. 98 In addition,
immigrants are a great force of entrepreneurship and innovation in
America.99 Some state and local governments understand that
immigrants benefit them economically, socially, and culturally.
Those state and local governments are trying to protect the health,
safety, and general welfare of its residents pursuant to the Tenth
Amendment. Consequently, local interests may not always be the
same as federal interests.
b. What is a sanctuary city?
The term “sanctuary city” is a broad term used to describe a
city, county, or state that has set policies to limit cooperation
between local law enforcement and federal immigration agencies. 100
Each of these policies vary in their scope; therefore, not all
sanctuary city policies completely bar local police from cooperating
with immigration officers.
The Sanctuary Movement was born in the 1980’s in response
to a heavy influx of Central Americans who came to the United
States because they were fleeing from civil wars in their
countries.101 Particularly, citizens of El Salvador and Guatemala
cage/wp/2017/07/14/jeff-sessions-used-our-research-to-claim-that-sanctuarycities-have-more-crime-hes-wrong/ (stating that Attorney General Jeff Sessions
incorrectly cited a study by saying that sanctuary cities have higher crimes in
average.).
96. Giovanni Peri, The Economic Benefits of Immigration, 2013 BERKELEY
REV. OF LATIN AM. STUD. 14 (2013).
97. David Bier, How Immigration Benefits America's Middle Class, THE
HILL (March 9, 2015, 6:00 AM), thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/
235003-how-immigration-benefits-americas-middle-class.
98. Peri, supra note 96.
99. Samier Mansur, How Immigration Benefits Americans And Is Key to US
Leadership in The World, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 13, 2017),
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/how-immigration-benefits-americans-and-iskey-to-us_us_59b6db42e4b02bebae75f071 (stating that more than 50% of the
billion-dollar companies in America were founded by immigrants and they “on
average, create 760 new jobs. 25% of all new businesses in the US are started
by immigrants; and these businesses have experienced 60% increase in wages
over the last decade”).
100. Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, And Can They Be Defunded?,
CNN (Jan. 25, 2017), www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-citiesexplained/index.html.
101. Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era,
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were fleeing from bloody civil wars and requested asylum in
America, which was denied.102 At the time, the U.S. government
was supporting the Salvadoran and Guatemalan government;
therefore, they were concerned that the international community
would view “[e]very approval of an application for political asylum .
. . [as] an admission that the United States [wa]s aiding
governments that violate the civil rights of their own citizens.” 103
Immigrants sought and found refuge in American churches,
which “declared their grounds as public sanctuary ‘in defiance of
federal immigration law’ risking their own freedoms.” 104 This
phenomenon was a response to the inaction of the American
government to provide relief to fleeing immigrants seeking
asylum.105 Following this sentiment, approximately twenty-three
cities and four states passed “sanctuary laws” that granted
“refugees the right to remain freely within their boundaries.” 106 In
time, “cities with no ties to the original sanctuary movement began
passing similar generalist resolutions prohibiting information
disclosure by public authorities.”107
In 2007, during the Bush Administration, there was a
resurgence of this movement.108 The New Sanctuary Movement
gained momentum when religious leaders met with immigrants to
talk about American immigration policies and the practical effects
in their communities.109 One of the main concerns was that
immigration raids were separating children born in the United
States from their undocumented parents.
This national initiative was led by churches across the country,
provided emotional support to immigrant communities, and pushed
for comprehensive immigration reform.110 The churches affiliated
with the movement also provided shelter to immigrants who were

MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), www.migrationpolicy.org/article/centralamericans-and-asylum-policy-reagan-era.
102. Id.
103. Katherine Bishop, U.S. Adopts New Policy for Hearings On Political
Asylum for Some Aliens, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 1990), www.nytimes.com/1990/
12/20/us/us-adopts-new-policy-for-hearings-on-political-asylum-for-somealiens.html.
104. Pamela Begaj, An Analysis Of Historical And Legal Sanctuary And A
Cohesive Approach To The Current Movement, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 135,
142-43 (2008).
105. Id. at 145.
106. Id.
107. Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance Of The Local In Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 601 (2008).
108. Begaj, supra note 104, at 145.
109. Id.
110. Kristina M. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid Is Never a Crime? The
Politics of Immigration Enforcement and The Provision Of Sanctuary, 63
SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 103 (2012).
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members of their congregation facing deportation. 111
c.

Overview of current sanctuary cities

The Sanctuary Movement began to spread to the point where
certain cities who were sympathetic to their local immigrant
communities started limiting their cooperation with federal
immigration enforcement. These cities began calling themselves
“sanctuaries” and established that their actions were meant to
promote public safety and strengthen their relationship with
immigrant communities.112 There are currently at least five states,
thirty-nine cities, and 364 counties that have sanctuary policies in
place.113
Because their laws and ordinances do not line up with “federal
policy, sanctuary cities use an anti-commandeering defense,
maintaining that the federal government ‘may not compel the
States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal
regulatory programs.’” 114 This line of defense has been successful
in court, especially when the claim is that sanctuary policies are
preempted by federal laws.115 In fact, certain sanctuary cities have
been ingeniously drafting their policies to circumvent provisions
like 8 U.S.C. §1373.116 This is achieved by implementing “don’t ask”
policies, which are meant to limit the amount of information local
law enforcement knows.117 Under this rationale, if local police do
111. Id. at 103-04.
112. McCormick, supra note 31, at 173-74.
113. See Amanda Sakuma, No Safe Place, MSNBC (last visited Oct. 8, 2017),
www.msnbc.com/specials/migrant-crisis/sanctuary-cities.
114. Raina Bhatt, Pushing An End To Sanctuary Cities: Will It Happen?, 22
MICH. J. RACE & L. 139, 140 (2016); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935 (1997) (holding that the “Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command
the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program”).
115. Bhatt, supra note 114 (citing Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rprtr. 3d 718
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009)).
116. Id. at 141; see also Michelle Ye Hee Lee, The White House’s claim that
‘sanctuary’ cities are violating the law, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/04/28/the-white-housesclaim-that-sanctuary-cities-are-violating-the-law/
(explaining
that
the
“sanctuary” jurisdictions accused of violating federal law “did not have explicit
policies limiting communication with the federal government on immigration
and citizenship, so they were not in clear violation of Section 1373”).
117. Bhatt, supra note 114; see also Priscilla Alvarez, Sessions's Climbdown
on Sanctuary Cities, THE ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2017/05/sessionss-climbdown-on-sanctuary-cities/527844/
(explaining that cities have written their policies around Section 1373: “Section
1373 is a ‘don’t-tell policy,’ so to work around it, some localities changed it to a
‘don’t-ask policy’ or a ‘don’t-use-municipal-resources’ policy”); Kelly Cohen,
Mayors tell Jeff Sessions: We are not 'sanctuary cities' , WASH. EXAMINER (Apr.
25, 2017), www.washingtonexaminer.com/mayors-tell-jeff-sessions-we-are-not-
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not inquire into a detainee’s immigration status, the police will not
have any information to share with federal immigration law
enforcement. The goal of the “don’t ask” policy is two-fold: (1) to
prevent local authorities from obtaining information about their
detainees’ immigration status so they will have nothing to hide if
they are required to submit information regarding their detainees
to the federal government; and (2) to allow immigrants to feel safe
enough to report crimes.

III. ANALYSIS
This comment will make a comparative analysis between
Chicago’s Welcoming City ordinance and Oak Park’s Welcoming
Village ordinance. It will discuss the conflict between these two
sanctuary policies and federal immigration law, their political and
legal challenges and carve-outs in the ordinances that are currently
hindering the full accomplishment of their goals.

A. Chicago’s History As a Sanctuary City
Chicago has a decades-long history as a city that strives to
embrace diversity while recognizing its reponsibilities to its
residents, regardless of their citizenship. The first step in becoming
a sanctuary city was made by Mayor Harold Washington when he
issued Executive Order 85-1 on March 7, 1985.118 The order
expressed its intention to “assure that all residents of the City of
Chicago, regardless of nationality or citizenship, shall have fair and
equal access to municipal benefits, opportunities and services.”119
In furtherance of this goal, Executive Order 85-1 provided that no
sanctuary-cities/article/2621223 (stating that several Mayors, including Jorge
Elorza, Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island claim they are in compliance with
Section 1373 because they are not “blocking the flow of information at all
between the federal government and state and local governments, and thus
aren't in violation of the law”).
118. See City of Chicago, Exec. Order No. 85-1 (Mar. 7, 1985); see also DORIS
MARIE PROVINE ET AL., POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON
THE FRONT LINES 24-25 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2016) (explaining that
sanctuary policies, like Chicago’s, “generally prevented local government
officials (including police) from communicating the immigration status of local
residents to federal immigration authorities”); Pablo A. Mitnik & Jessica
Halpern-Finnerty, Immigration and Local Governments: Inclusionary Local
Policies in the Era of State Rescaling, in Taking Local Control: Immigration
Policy Activism in U.S. Cities and States 51, 55 (Monica W. Varsanyi ed.,
Stanford University Press 2010) (discussing that between 1985 and 1989,
Chicago, Takoma Park, San Francisco, and New York “passed city ordinances
or issued executive orders prohibiting city employees from gathering, keeping,
or sharing with ICE’s precursor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), information on the immigration status of their residents…”).
119. See City of Chicago, Exec. Order No. 85-1 (March 7, 1985).
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city agents or agencies would “request information about or
otherwise investigate or assist in the investigation of the citizenship
or residency status of any person” unless required by a law or court
decision.120 Additionally, they would not disseminate information
about a person’s immigration status unless required by legal
process.121 Washington emphasized that it was the city’s legal
mandate to pursue the public good and that the city would not
participate in the infringement of human rights. 122
After Mayor Richard M. Daley took office in 1989, he issued
Executive Order 89-6 on April 25, 1989, which was similar to
Executive Order 85-1.123 On March 29, 2006, both of the executive
orders were incorporated by the City Council into an ordinance,
Chapter 2-173 of the Municipal Code.124 In the ordinance’s
preamble, the City Council expressed its concern that the promotion
of immigration enforcement by local agencies would increase
“immigrant and minority profiling and harrassment.”125 It
emphasized that this kind of cooperation would have “a chilling
effect on crime prevention and solving if both witnesses and victims
are called upon to weigh a need to cooperate with local authorities
against a fear of deportation…”126
On September 2012, Mayor Rahm Emmanuel expanded the
ordinance and renamed it the Welcoming City Ordinance. This
amendment was in response to the increasing number of
immigration detainer requests the City was receiving. 127 Its
intention was to provide basic protections to “undocumented
Chicagoans who have not been convicted of a serious crime and are
not wanted on a criminal warrant.”128 Thus, Chicago law
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Craig B. Mousin, A Clear View from the Prairie: Harold Washington
and the People of Illinois Respond to Federal Encroachment of Human Rights
29 S. ILL. U. L. J. 285, 295 (2005).
123. See City of Chicago, Exec. Order No. 89-6 (Apr. 25, 1989) (reiterating
that “[n]o agent or agency shall condition the provision of City of Chicago
benefits, opportunities or services on matters related to citizenship or residency
status unless required to do so by statute, ordinance, federal regulation or court
decision”).
124. See Complaint at 7, City of Chi. v. Sessions No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 149847 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 15, 2017).
125. See Chi. Mun. Code §2-173 (2006), chicityclerk.com/legislation-records/
journals-and-reports/journals-proceedings.
126. Id. (stating that the effect of victims’ and witnesses’ fear of deportation
would undermine “long-standing efforts to engender trust and cooperation
between law enforcement officials and immigrant communities”).
127. See Complaint at 7, City of Chi. v. Sessions No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 149847 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 15, 2017) (explaining that the Welcoming
City ordinance expansion intended to “address increasing federal requests that
Chicago detain individuals suspected of immigration-related offenses”).
128. Press Release, Office of the Mayor City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel
Introduces Welcoming City Ordinance (July 10, 2012) www.cityofchicago.org/
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enforcement will not “arrest, detain or continue to detain a person
solely on the belief that the person is not present legally in the
United States, or that the person has committed a civil immigration
violation,” or when an administrative warrant or detainer is only
based on a “violation of a civil immigration law.”129
Finally, in 2016 the Welcoming City Ordinance underwent
another amendment to protect immigrants from being “subjected to
physical abuse, threats or intimidation.” 130 This was in response to
a highly publicized case in 2014 where a police office threatened and
verbally abused the manager of a tanning salon while operating a
raid.131 Additionally, Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant statements
during his presidential campaign further fueled the decision to pass
an amendment that would promote respectful treatment toward
immigrants.132 However, while Chicago’s sanctuary city policies
have paved way toward a more respectful treatment of immigrants,
its Welcoming City Ordinance still contains carve-outs (or
loopholes) that exclude a great amount of immigrants from basic
protections.

B. Oak Park’s Welcoming Village Ordinance
On February 6, 2017, Oak Park passed the Welcoming Village
Ordinance.133 The goal of the ordinance is to make Oak Park an
“immigrant-friendly Village” and strengthen the city’s relationship
with its immigrant communities by promoting equal treatment of
its residents notwithstanding their immigration status. 134 The
city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2012/july_2012/mayor_emanue
l_introduceswelcomingcityordinance.html (stating that the ordinance
expansion will “ensure that undocumented Chicagoans will only be detained if
they are wanted on a criminal warrant by local or federal authorities, if they
have been convicted of a serious crime and remain in the United States illegally,
or if they are otherwise a clear threat to public safety or national security”).
129. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-042(a) (2012).
130. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-005 (2012).
131. See John Byrne, Chicago Police Banned from Threatening Immigrants
Under
Emanuel-backed Measure,
CHI. TRIB.
(Sept. 28, 2016)
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-emanuel-immigrant-treatmentordinance-met-20160928-story.html; see also Associated Press, City Approves
Settlement for Tanning Salon Manager in Police Abuse Case, NBC CHI. (Sept.
8,
2014),
www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/City-Approves-Settlement-forTanning-Salon-Manager-in-Police-Abuse-Case-274400761.html (stating that
the Chicago City Council Finance Committee approved a settlement of $150,000
for the tanning salon manager who was verbally abused by an officer).
132. Byrne, supra note 131 (quoting Alderman Scott Waguespack, one of the
Aldermen promoting the amendment: “I want to encourage all our city leaders
and officials, all of our organizations out there, to continue to move our city
forward in a way that is inclusive, that doesn't take the clock backwards, as our
Republican nominee for president wants to”).
133. OAK PARK, IL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7 (2017).
134. Id.
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initial version of the ordinance was similar to those enacted by
Chicago and Evanston, thus it contained loopholes allowing certain
instances where local police would still have the opportunity to
collaborate with federal immigration law enforcement. 135 However,
the final version of the ordinance was updated so that it would be
exemption-free.
Oak Park’s Welcoming Village Ordinance has been praised as
“the strongest, most progressive and inclusive ordinance in the
country.”136 Whereas many sanctuary ordinances allow for some
local police cooperation with ICE, Oak Park will collaborate with
ICE only if it has a valid criminal warrant.137 The ordinance also
provides that local law enforcement will not “stop, arrest, detain, or
continue to detain a person after that person becomes eligible for
release from custody or is free to leave an encounter with an agent
or agency” when: (1) an immigration detainer has been issued; (2)
there is an administrative warrant; and (3) there is a belief that the
person is not legally present in the United States, or the person
commited a civil immigration infraction.138
The ordinance also states that agents and agencies will not
assist federal immigration authorities with immigration
enforcement operations unless provided by law. 139 It further
provides that no agents or agencies are to inquire about a person’s
immigration status unless it is court-ordered.140 Moreover, Oak
Park will not enter into MOAs with federal immigration law
enforcement to deputize Oak Park’s officers to perform immigration
officer functions under Section 1357(g).141
The ordinance prohibits agents or agencies to “coerce,
including using threats of deportation, or engage in verbal abuse of
any person” based on a person’s immigration status or a person’s
135. Oak Park, Ill., Town Hall Meeting Minutes (January 1, 2008) oakpark.legistar.com/Calendar.aspx.
136. See Timothy Inklebarger, Oak Park Approves Sanctuary City
Ordinance, OAKPARK.COM (Feb. 7, 2017), www.oakpark.com/News/Articles/2-72017/Oak-Park-approves-sanctuary-city-ordinance/.
137. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-5(D) (2017) (stating that
“unless presented with a valid and properly issued criminal warrant, no agency
or agent shall: (1) Permit ICE agents access to a person being detained by, or in
the custody of, the agency or agent; (2) Transfer any person into ICE custody;
(3); Permit ICE agents use of agency facilities, information … (4) Expend the
time of the agency or agent in responding to ICE inquiries or communicating
with ICE regarding a person’s custody status, release date, or contact
information”).
138. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-5(A) (2017).
139. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-5(B) (2017).
140. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-2 (2017) (articulating that no
agent or agency “shall request information about or otherwise investigate or
assist in the investigation of the citizenship or immigration status of any person
unless such inquiry or investigation is required by an order of a court of
competent jurisdiction”).
141. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-5(C) (2017).
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family member’s perceived or actual immigration status. 142 It
prevents local agents and agencies from “conditioning benefits,
services, or opportunities” based on a person’s immigration
status.143 In addition, the Village accepts a photo identity document
from the person’s country of origin in lieu of a state driver’s license
or identification card.144 It also establishes that if any information
regarding a person’s immigration status is acquired for the purpose
of providing benefits, services or opportunities, this information will
be promply deleted after its use.145

C. Potential Conflicts between Chicago and Oak Park’s
Policies and Federal Immigration Law
The polarization of the United States regarding its stance on
immigration is reflected in the policies of its municipalities, which
may drastically differ from one another even when they are
geographical neighbors.146 Some states and cities are actively
cooperating with federal immigration law enforcement through one
or several of its enforcement tools and have enacted restrictive
policies to increase immigration enforcement.147 On the other hand,
many cities like Chicago and Oak Park are passing ordinances that
acknowledge responsibility over their residents and are striving to
provide them with basic rights notwithstanding their immigration
status.148
Sanctuary city opponents have questioned the validity of some
of these provisions arguing that they are in conflict with Section

142. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-3 (2017) (explaining that a
family member may be the person’s immediate family; a legal guardian
appointed by the court; or the person’s domestic partner and most of the
domestic partner’s immediate family).
143. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-4(A) (2017) (providing that no
agent or agency “shall condition the provision of the Village benefits,
opportunities, or services on matters related to citizenship or immigration
status unless required to do so by statute, federal regulation, or an order of a
court of competent jurisdiction”).
144. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-4(B) (2017).
145. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-4(C) (2017).
146. See Provine et al., supra note 118, at 47 (explaining that “it is not
unusual for a city that has a supportive policy to be embedded in a county with
an enforcement orientation”).
147. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 3, at 85 (2015)
(asserting that there is considerable component of partisanship in places with
restrictive legislation where “a high proportion of restrictive ordinances (77
percent) have passed in Republican-majority municipalities”).
148. Id. at 78 (stating that out of their study’s dataset of 25,000 cities, “125
had proposed restrictive ordinances between 2005 and 2011, and 93 had
proposed pro-immigrant ordinances, including measures limiting cooperation
with federal authorities on deportations”).
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1373 of the United States Code.149 One of Donald Trump’s
presidential campaign’s central themes was his harsh position on
immigration.150 As President of the United States, his antiimmigrant rhetoric has not mellowed and his administration began
to target sanctuary cities within his first year in office.
On January 25, 2017, five days after President Trump was
inaugurated, he issued Executive Order 13768.151 Section 9(a) of
this Executive Order states that the Executive branch must ensure
that local jurisdictions are complying with Section 1373.152 It grants
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security the
discretion to determine whether cities should receive federal grants
based on their compliance with Section 1373 and whether they
prevent or hinder federal immigration law enforcement.153 On July
25, 2017, the Department of Justice announced that new conditions
would be added to the Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
(“Byrne JAG”) in an effort to “increase information sharing between
federal, state, and local law enforcement, [while] ensuring that
federal immigration authorities have the information they need to
enforce immigration laws and keep our communities safe.” 154 The
Department of Justice is threatening to withdraw the Byrne JAG
funds from Chicago and for this reason the City sued the Attorney

149. See Ilya Somin, Fight over sanctuary cities is also a fight over federalism
THE HILL (Apr. 7, 2018), thehill.com/opinion/immigration/381998-fight-oversanctuary-cities-is-also-a-fight-over-federalism
(discussing
the
Trump
Administration’s efforts to deny Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance
Grants to any states or localities that do not comply with Section 1373).
150. Janell Ross, From Mexican Rapists to Bad Hombres, the Trump
Campaign
in
Two
Moments,
WASH. POST
(Oct.
20,
2016),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/20/from-mexican-rapiststo-bad-hombres-the-trump-campaign-in-two-moments/ (quoting Donald Trump
during his announcement speech in June 2015 saying that when Mexico sends
people to the U.S. “[t]hey’re sending people that have lots of problems, and
they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re
bringing crime. They’re rapists”).
151. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
152. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
153. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017)
(providing that the Attorney General “shall take appropriate enforcement
action against any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. 1373, or which has in effect a
statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of Federal
law”).
154. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Attorney
General Sessions Announces Immigration Compliance Requirements for
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs (July 25, 2017),
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-immigrationcompliance-requirements-edward-byrne-memorial (asserting that “from now
on, the Department will only provide Byrne JAG grants to cities and states that
comply with federal law, allow federal immigration access to detention facilities,
and provide 48 hours notice before they release an illegal alien wanted by
federal authorities”).
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General seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.155
As sanctuary cities, both Chicago and Oak Park are vulnerable
to accusations regarding their compliance with Section 1373.
However, there is no language in Section 1373 that indicates there
is a mandatory obligation for local law enforcement to cooperate
with federal immigration authorities.156 It only prohibits state and
local jurisdictions from restricting state and local agencies from
sharing information, but it does not create a duty for them to share
such information.157 Additionally, Section 1373 does not instruct
local authorities on what to do with any acquired information when
federal law enforcement has not requested it. 158
Chicago’s Welcoming City Ordinance provides that local
agencies not request or keep any information regarding a person’s
immigration status.159 Therefore, Chicago is fully complying with
Section 1373, as it does not prohibit its employees from sharing
information regarding people’s immigration status because it has
no information to provide federal immigration agencies with.160
Moreover, Section 30 of the Welcoming City Ordinance provides
that the City’s agents or agencies are required to share any
information and assist in the investigation of a person’s
immigration status if federal law requires it, thus the ordinance is
in full compliance with Section 1373.161
155. See Complaint, City of Chi. v. Sessions No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 149847 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 15, 2017).
156. McCormick, supra note 31.
157. Memorandum from Edward Siskel, Corporation Counsel, City of
Chicago, to Tracey Trautman, Acting Director, Bureau of Justice Assistance,
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice at 7 (June 30, 3017),
www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20
Releases/2017/August/080717_ExAComplaint.PDF
[hereinafter
Siskel]
(indicating that Section 1373 “relates solely to prohibitions on sharing an
individual’s citizenship or immigration status among governmental entities,
and does not require that such information be shared”).
158. See Complaint at 17, City of Chi. v. Sessions No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 149847 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 15, 2017) (asserting that Section 1373
“imposes no affirmative obligation on state or local entities to collect
immigration status information; does not require state or local entities to take
any specific actions upon receiving immigration status information absent a
request for that information.”).
159. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-020 (2012)
(providing that “no agent or agency shall request information about or
otherwise investigate or assist in the investigation of the citizenship or
immigration status of any person unless such inquiry or investigation is
requires by Illinois Statute, federal regulation, or court decision”).
160. See Siskel, supra note 157, at 7 (arguing that Chicago’s “non-collection
policy means that Chicago generally does not possess information to “send[],”
but that policy does not prevent any ‘sending’ or ‘receiving’”).
161. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-030 (2012)
(stating that “except as otherwise provided under applicable federal law, no
agent or agency shall disclose information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status of any person unless required to do so by legal process…”).
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D. Sanctuary Cities’ Commitment to its Residents
The regulation of immigration is the responsibility of the
federal government; state and local law enforcement agencies do not
have the constitutional authority to enforce immigration law.162
However, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
dictates that no state shall discriminate against its residents. 163
Nevertheless, oftentimes city residents are subjected to racial
profiling and other civil rights violations, which leads to distrust in
local law enforcement.164
For this reason, many cities with large populations of
immigrants, like Chicago and Oak Park, are focusing on increasing
public safety through the enforcement of local laws instead of
enforcing federal immigration laws.165 Cities like Chicago and Oak
Park intend to increase public safety by promoting trust between
immigrant communities and local law enforcement. The rationale
is that the city’s responsibility is to treat its residents with respect
and dignity, regardless of their immigration status. Equal treament
of all residents will also create trust in local police so that
immigrants feel safe enough to contact them and report crimes
without fear of deportation.166

162. RODRIGUEZ ET AL., supra note 8, at 33 (explaining that in De Canas v.
Bica, “the [Supreme] Court noted that regulating immigration is the exclusive
responsibility of the federal government”).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that “no State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities or citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; not deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws”).
164. Mitnik & Halpern-Finnerty, supra note 118, at 53 (explaining that local
police cooperation in immigration enforcement “can lead to community
mistrust, racial profiling, and civil rights violations”); see also Provine et al.,
supra note 118, at 21 (articulating that “[s]tate legislatures have repeatedly
sought to diminish the rights of some of their foreign-born residents and their
American progeny on the basis of discriminatory conceptions of racial and
cultural identity”).
165. Press Release, Office of the Mayor City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel
Mayor Emanuel Introduces Welcoming City Ordinance (July 10, 2012),
www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2012/jul
y_2012/mayor_emanuel_introduceswelcomingcityordinance.html (stating that
in Chicago, things are done “a little differently because we put public safety
above political stunts and we put creating a united, cohesive society over trying
to draw dividing lines”).
166. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-005 (2012)
(emphasizing that “cooperation of all persons, both documented citizens and
those without documentation status, is essential to achieve the City’s goals of
protecting life and property, preventing crime and resolving problems”).
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E. Is it enough? Carve-outs in Chicago’s Welcoming
City Ordinance
Sanctuary policies can differ greatly from one another. All the
term means is that a state or local jurisdiction has enacted a policy
that limits cooperation with federal immigration enforcement
agencies.167 So, this can take many shapes. Pro-immigrant
advocates have asserted that many of these sanctuary policies do
not protect immigrants in a significant way that would accomplish
the goals of its city due to carve-outs in the law itself.
While Chicago's Welcoming City Ordinance has evolved in the
past several years through amendments, there are four particular
carve-outs that still allow sufficient cooperation with federal
immigration agencies and are likely hindering the full
accomplishment of its goals. Pursuant to the ordinance, Chicago law
enforcement will comply with an immigration detainer when a
person “has an outstanding criminal warrant” or has a felony
conviction.168 These two requirements for compliance with an
immigration detainer are concerning because they are operating
under the misunderstanding that undocumented immigrants with
outstanding criminal warrants or felony convictions have commited
violent offenses, thus excluding them from sanctuary. However, not
all outstanding criminal warrants and felony convictions pertain to
violent offenses, and many of these oustanding warrants and
convictions may be decades-old.169 Thus, a person may face
disproportionate consequences, like deportation, for a decades-old
non-violent offense, which could be a traffic violation or an old
parole violation.170
167. Jasmine C. Lee, Rudy Omri & Julia Preston, What Are Sanctuary
Cities?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/
02/us/sanctuary-cities.html (explaining that “sanctuary policies often mean
local officials do not ask about a person’s immigration status, but there is no
universal definition for a sanctuary city”).
168. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-042(c) (2012).
169. Jennifer Chacón, The 1996 Immigration Laws Come of Age, 9 DREXEL
L. REV. 297 (2017). Since the passage of the 1996 immigration laws, the criminal
enforcement system has aided immigration enforcement by prioritizing
immigration offenses: “As of 2011, immigration offenses were the single largest
category of federal criminal prosecutions, and the bulk of those prosecutions
were for misdemeanor illegal entry and felony reentry.” Id. at 304.
170. Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union to Mayor Rahm
Emanuel
and
Chicago
City
Council
(July
10,
2017),
www.scribd.com/document/355384873/ACLU-Letter-in-Support-ofStrengthening-Chicago-Welcoming-City-Ordinance (explaining that “under the
carve-out for any individual with a prior felony conviction, a person with a 20year-old”); see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 135 (Harvard University Press 2010) (explaining that
“[e]ven misdemeanor shoplifting could not result in deportation in some
cicrcuits”).
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Furthermore, law enforcement will also comply with a detainer
when a person “is a defendant in a criminal case … where a
judgment has not been entered and a felony charge is pending; [or]
has been identified as a known gang member either in a law
enforcement agency’s database or by his own admission.”171 These
two requirements are problematic because people under these
situations are not given due process. Police may still communicate
with ICE when a person who has a felony charge is in their
database. This means that even though a person has not been
convicted of a crime, she will be treated as if she had a criminal
conviction before proven guilty. 172 And regardless of the outcome of
her criminal case, police will have already alerted federal
immigration authorities of her presence, so she will likely be subject
to deportation, despite being innocent of the charges against her.
Additionally, Chicago’s police can communicate with ICE when
a person comes up in their database as a gang member. This
provision is concerning because the gang database system has no
procedural protections in place and is known to be unreliable. 173
Further, the public does not know the criteria for including people’s
names and when a person is added to the database, they are not
informed of such action.174
Many immigrants are left vulnerable and unprotected due to
these carve-outs. Yet, the carve-outs do not provide extra
protections to the public as a whole. Although one may initially
believe only the violent criminals are excluded from sanctuary to
enhance public safety, the reality of these provisions tells us
otherwise.

IV. PROPOSAL
In order to protect the immigrants who have been left out from
the current Welcoming City Ordinance, Chicago should amend its
ordinance by looking to Oak Park’s Welcoming Village ordinance

171. CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-042(c) (2012).
172. Spielman, supra note 9 (quoting Tania Unzueta, a representative for
Mijente, an immigrant rights organization, stating that “we have a court system
in the United States that says people are innocent until proven guilty. It is a
complete violation of due process for someone to be considered a dangerous
person when they actually haven’t gone through the court system”).
173. Rebecca A. Hufstader, Immigration Reliance on Gang Databases:
Unchecked Discretion and Undesirable Consequences, 90 N.Y.U.L. REV. 671,
689 (2015) (discussing that gang databases “do not employ sufficient safeguards
of fairness and accuracy to merit their increasing significance in the
immigration context”).
174. Id. (explaining that “unlike a criminal conviction, documentation in a
gang database requires no criminal conduct whatsoever, making it especially
difficult for an individual who fits the racial profile of a gang member in his
geographic area to avoid documentation”).

424

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:395

and adopting some of its language. There are four main areas that
are highly problematic and need to be stricken if Chicago wants to
truly protect immigrants’ basic rights by avoiding cooperation with
federal immigration agencies. The four areas that should be
eliminated from the Welcoming City Ordinance provide that
Chicago law enforcement will comply with a detainer and arrest,
detain, or continue to detain a person if: (1) there is an outstanding
criminal warrant against them; (2) she has a felony conviction; (3)
she has a pending felony charge and no judgment has been entered
yet; and (4) she has been identified as a gang member in the Chicago
Police Department’s (“CPD”) gang database.175
Moreover, Chicago’s Welcoming City ordinance should expand
its definitions of “verbal abuse” and “coercion.” Chicago should also
strengthen its commitment to establishing a bridge of trust between
immigrant communities and law enforcement by following Oak
Park’s footsteps and adding a “Federal Registry Program” provision
and a provision against entering into agreements (MOA’s) under
Section 1357(g). These amendments would sufficiently strengthen
the ordinance and would consequently make it exemption-free.
The first step toward making Chicago’s Welcoming City
ordinance exemption-free is to completely get rid of Section 2-173042(c), which contains the four main carve-outs discussed above.
Section 2-173-042(c)(1) provides that the CPD will comply with
detainers if there is an outstanding criminal warrant for a
person.176 This provision does not necessarily protect Chicago
residents from dangerous criminals, but it does make nondangerous immigrants vulnerable to unfair treatment. This is
because more than half of Cook County’s criminal warrants are
more than ten years old.177 Further, the fact that there is an
outstanding warrant against someone does not make that person
dangerous.178 These warrants may have been issued for non-violent
offenses like traffic violations, including speeding or parking
tickets, or violations of probation or supervision conditions, among
others.179 Therefore, the repercussions of having an outstanding
175. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-005 (2012).
176. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-042(c)(1) (2012).
177. See Frank Main, Dart Supports Plan to Keep Warrants from
Languishing for Decades, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), chicago.suntimes.com/
chicago-politics/dart-supports-bill-to-keep-warrants-from-languishing-fordecades/.
178. Chacón, supra note 169, at 304 (explaining that although scholars have
questions the legality and harshness of the immigration detention system,
“[f]ederal legislators and executive branch officials have justified the ongoing
rapid expansion of immigration detention on both retributive and general
deterrence grounds that seem ill-suited to a purportedly civil system”).
179. Main, supra note 177 (stating that “according to a sheriff’s office study
of 41,149 warrants that were outstanding in Cook County on Jan. 19, most were
issued because a defendant had violated a judge’s conditions of probation or
supervision — such as passing a drug test or doing community service”).
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warrant issued against someone for a non-violent offense are
absurdly disproportionate. A Chicago police officer may decide to
comply with an immigration detainer and have that person
potentially deported for a decade-old traffic violation. This means
that old criminal warrants and more recent criminal warrants may
result in the deportation of an undocumented immigrant.
Second, under Section 2-173-042(c)(2), Chicago law
enforcement may comply with an immigration detainer when a
person has a felony conviction.180 This has very similar
repercussions as Section 2-173-042(c)(1), discussed above. Not all
felony convictions correlate to violent offenses. Also, a police officer
may comply with a detainer even when a person has a decades-old
felony conviction for a non-violent offense. This means that if
someone is detained and later released because law enforcement
finds that she did not commit an offense, a police officer can still
comply with an immigration detainer and hold her after she is
eligible for release due to a twenty-year-old felony conviction.
Third, Section 2-173-042(c)(3) provides that local law
enforcement may comply with an immigration detainer when a
person has a pending felony charge.181 This provision allows for
police officers to treat undocumented immigrants as convicted
criminals when no judgment has been entered yet. Consequently,
even if a person is ultimately found not guilty of the felony charge,
the consequences caused by the CPD’s compliance with an
immigration detainer cannot be backtracked. Thus, the person may
end up in removal proceedings, and possibly deported.
Fourth, Section 2-173-042(c)(4) provides that local law
enforcement can comply with an immigration detainer by detaining
or prolonging someone’s detention if her name is in their gang
database. This provision is concerning because the accuracy of gang
databases has been known to be questioned. 182 Although it varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it has been propounded by legal
scholars that the criteria used to include a person’s name in gang
databases is overbroad and fuzzy.183 Further, there are concerns of
180. CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-042(c)(2) (2012).
181. CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-042(c)(3) (2012).
182. Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2
STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 115, 129 (2005) (asserting that“gang databases appear to
be riddled with factual inaccuracies, administrative errors, lack of compliance
with departmental guidelines, and lack of oversight”).
183. Id. at 129-30 (stating that “commentators have argued that anti-gang
injunctions, which generally apply to documented gang members, are
unconstitutionally vague, overly broad, impinge on rights to free association,
and suggest guilt by association.”); see also K. Babe Howell, Fear Itself: The
Impact of Allegations of Gang Affiliation on Pre-Trial Detention, 23 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 620, 652 (2011) (asserting that “the result of these broad criteria is that
individuals who never belonged in a gang, but were observed with friends or
relatives, photographed with them, and dress in the normal styles for urban
youth, are included in gang databases”).
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procedural due process violations: the police have full discretion as
to who is included in the list; people who are on the list are not
aware of it until they encounter a problem because they are on the
list; people who are included on the list can only fight to be removed
from it once they have faced legal problems due to their inclusion
on the list; and there is little oversight on the databases, so those
who are found to be non-gang members are rarely deleted from the
list.184 Considering that there is a high risk of mistake due to the
inaccuracies in the gang databases, this should not be used as a
reason under which local law enforcement has the discretion to
comply with detainers. Therefore, Section 2-173-042(c)(4) should be
stricken from the ordinance.
Moreover, the definitions of “coercion” and “verbal abuse” in
the Welcoming City ordinance should be expanded in order to
incorporate behavior from law enforcement that should be deterred.
The definition of coercion establishes that it is “the use of improper
or unlawful force or threats, express or implied, in order to compel
a person to act against his or her will.” 185 It also includes
“compelling a person to make statements.” 186 Even though this
definition is almost as complete as Oak Park’s Welcoming Village
ordinance, it misses a particular element that is necessary to avoid
police misconduct.
A common issue undocumented immigrants encounter when
they interact with law enforcement is that either they will receive
express or implied threats by the police to coerce them to act a
certain way, or their family members will be threatened. In many
occasions, the undocumented immigrant’s family members will
have legal status in the United States, therefore the ordinance
would arguably not cover them. For this reason, following Oak
Park’s steps in including “a person or family member” into Chicago’s
definition would expand the definition, making it wholly inclusive
to undocumented immigrants and their family members.187
The Chicago’s definition of “verbal abuse” should also be
modified to be more inclusive. Oak Park’s Welcoming Village
ordinance defines “verbal abuse” as “the use of oral or written
remarks that are overtly insulting, mocking or belittling, directed
at a person based upon the actual or perceived race, immigration
184. K. Babe Howell, Juvenile Justice: Gang Databases: Labeled For Life, 35
THE CHAMPION 28, 34 (2011) (explaining that “once an individual is placed in a
law enforcement gang database, whether accurately or inaccurately, there is
little oversight or incentive to ensure the databases are purged of non-gang
members or former gang members”).
185. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-010 (2012).
186. Id.
187. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-1 (2017) (defining “Coerce: To
use express or implied threats towards a person or any family member of a
person that attempts to put the person in immediate fear of the consequences
in order to compel that person to act against his or her will”).
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status, color, ancestry, or national origin.” 188 Given our current
political climate where people are harrassed on the streets due to
their religion, English proficiency, sex, sexual orientation, or gender
identity, we should follow the footsteps of Oak Park’s Welcoming
Village ordinance and expand the defintion to encompass these
other reasons by which one may receive verbal abuse.189
Chicago’s Welcoming City ordinance establishes that unless
local law enforcement has a legitimate law enforcement purpose
that does not relate to civil immigration law, it shall not “expend
their time responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE
regarding a person’s custody or release” while on duty. 190
Nonetheless, this provision could be strengthened by detailing other
forms of non-cooperation. The “Federal Registry Program” provision
in Oak Park’s Welcoming Village ordinance is a good example of
such a provision. It states that law enforcement shall not expend
any resources in facilitating the creation, publication or upkeep of
a federal program that maintais a registry of people based on place
of origin, ancestry or religion.191 Not collaborating in any way,
shape, or form in the maintenance of these databases will surely
enhance the trust between immigrants and the police. Thus,
Chicago should look into adapting Oak Park’s text into the
Welcoming City ordinance.
Finally, it is common knowledge that Chicago is currently
opposed to cooperating with federal immigration law enforcement,
evidenced by its refusal to enter into MOA’s with federal authorities
under Section 1357(g). However, adding a provision to the
ordinance Welcoming Village’s Section 13-7-5(C), specifying that
the city shall not enter into any agreements would further
strengthen the ordinance and would make it harder for future
administrations to overcome this obstacle should it attempt to enter
into an agreement with DHS.192

188. OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-1 (2017).
189. Id.
190. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-042(b)(1)(C)
(2012).
191. See OAK PARK, ILL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-1 (2017) (establishing that “no
agency shall expend any time, facilities, equipment, information, or other
resources of the agency or agent to facilitate the creation, publication, or
maintenance of any federal program to register individuals present in the
United States based on their ancestry, national origin, or religion, or the
participation of any village residents in such a registry”).
192. See OAK PARK, IL., VILLAGE CODE 13-7-5(C) (2017) (providing that “no
agency or agent shall enter into an agreement under Section 1357(G) of Title 8
of the United States Code or any other federal law that permits state or local
governmental entities to enforce federal immigration laws”).
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CONCLUSION

Chicago is one of the most diverse cities in the world, as one
out of five of its residents is an immigrant. 193 Chicago’s Welcoming
City ordinance still contains carve-outs that allow for some
cooperation between the Chicago Police Department and federal
immigration law enforcement. The primary goal of sanctuary
ordinances is to strengthen the relationship between local law
enforcement and immigrant communities by treating immigrants,
regardless of their immigration status, with “respect and
dignity.”194
Unfortunately, the protections the ordinance provides does not
extend to all immigrants. The carve-outs discussed above exclude
certain immigrants and leave most vulnerable. Because there may
be uncertainties as to whether these carve-outs apply to them or
not, undocumented immigrants will continue to shy away from
contacting law enforcement when they have witnessed a crime or
been victims of a crime. These proposed amendments to Chicago’s
Welcoming City ordinance would include the group of immigrants
that has been excluded, exposed, and vulnerable. Broadening the
ordinance will strengthen the immigrant community’s trust in local
law enforcement, which will ultimately accomplish the City’s
objective of protecting the life and property of all its residents.

193. See CHICAGO, ILL., ILL. CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-173-005 (2012)
(stating that “the vitality of the City of Chicago (the “City”), one of the most
ethnically, racially and religiously diverse cities in the world, where one-out-offive of the City’s residents is an immigrant, has been built on the strength of its
immigrant communities”).
194. See id. (emphasizing that “immigrant community members, whether
documented citizens or not, should be treated with respect and dignity by all
City employees and should not be subjected to physical abuse, threats, or
intimidation”).

